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A Theory of Slow-Moving Capital and Contagion
Abstract
Fire sales that occur during crises beg the question of why su¢ cient outside capital does
not move in quickly to take advantage of re sales, or in other words, why outside capital
is so slow-moving. We propose an answer to this puzzle in the context of an equilibrium
model of capital allocation. Keeping capital in liquid form in anticipation of possible re
sales entails costs in terms of foregone protable investments. Set against this, those same
protable investments are rendered illiquid in future due to agency problems embedded with
expertise. We show that a robust consequence of this trade-o¤ between making investments
today and waiting for arbitrage opportunities in future is the combination of occasional re
sales and limited stand-by capital that moves in only if re-sale discounts are su¢ ciently
deep. An extension of our model to several types of investments gives rise to a novel channel
for contagion where su¢ ciently adverse shocks to one type can induce re sales in other types
that are fundamentally unrelated, provided arbitrage activity in these investments is sourced
from a common pool of capital.
J.E.L. Classication: G21, G28, G38, E58, D62.
Keywords: re sales, arbitrage, illiquidity, crises, spillover.
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1 Introduction
Our understanding of nancial crises has been enhanced by a large and rapidly growing
empirical literature that has documented the incidence and severity of re sales by distressed
parties in a wide range of asset classes.1 Indeed, it would not be too much of an exaggeration
to say that re sales have been a dening feature of most nancial crises.
The term re salecarries the connotation that assets are being sold at prices that are
below some benchmark, fair fundamental price that would prevail in the absence of a crisis.
However, the notion that assets are being sold at prices below their fundamental value begs
an important question. How can re sales take place in a world where arbitrage capital
waits on the sidelines waiting to take advantage of articially low prices? If there were such
arbitrageurs who wait on the sidelines, would they not compete with each other as soon as
the crisis erupts, providing a cushion for prices? In short, the question is how re sales can
happen as an equilibrium phenomenon when investors can choose ex ante to hold arbitrage
capital in anticipation of re-sale opportunities.
Our paper provides a theoretical framework to answer this question, and then derives
implications for the social value of arbitrage capital. We show why the joint occurrence
of re sales and limited arbitrage capital is a robust equilibrium outcome arising from the
following fundamental trade-o¤ faced by investors when deciding ex ante on the allocation
of capital. On the one hand, protable activities require investments in expertise, but these
very investments render them illiquid in the future due to the separation of owners who have
expertise from those who nance them. On the other hand, setting aside capital in the form
of liquid assets to exploit arbitrage opportunities in the future entails current costs in the
form of foregone protable investments and not investing in expertise.
In equilibrium, the two choices whether to invest in protable activities or to set aside
funds for arbitrage in the future must earn the same rate of return when viewed ex ante.
This requirement implies that equilibrium is characterized by limited provision of arbitrage
capital in the economy where the limit is both in quantity and in expertise. Arbitrage
capital being limitedin this respect, re sales during crises become a robust phenomenon,
even though investors can anticipate them as part of the equilibrium.
Our model features an interior equilibrium where the proportion of arbitrageurs in the
economy is bounded strictly away both from zero and from one. This is because if all investors
1Fire sales have been shown to exist in distressed sales of aircrafts by Pulvino (1998), in cash auctions in
bankruptcies by Stromberg (2000), in creditor recoveries during industry-wide distress especially for industries
with high asset-specicity by Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007), in equity markets when mutual funds
engage in sales of similar stocks by Coval and Sta¤ord (2007), and in an international setting where foreign
direct investment increases during emerging market crises to acquire assets at steep discounts in the evidence
by Krugman (1998), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), and Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2007).
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choose to undertake protable investments, then shocks lead to steep price discounts, as there
is no arbitrage capital to cushion the shock. In such a world, the shadow value of arbitrage
capital is very high, and can be foreseen to be high ex ante. Some investors will therefore
choose to become arbitrageurs at the ex ante stage. However, the shadow value of arbitrage
capital falls as more investors choose to become arbitrageurs. If there is abundant arbitrage
capital, the returns are too low to justify holding it in anticipation of crises.
In equilibrium, there is a limited amount of arbitrage capital in the economy in some states
of the world at which arbitrageurs prot from re sales. While asymmetric information when
assets are complex in nature can result in re sales, in our model the main reason for the
existence of re sales is the limited provision of arbitrage capital, whereby even non-complex
assets su¤er from re-sale discounts.
The slow-movingnature of arbitrage capital arises from the fact that there are learning-
by-doing e¤ects, so that arbitrageurs, being outsiders, have not invested in expertise or
simply cannot do so right at the time arbitrage opportunities become available. Hence, they
do not move in to acquire assets unless discounts are su¢ ciently steep, or in richer models,
until they have gained expertise by rst deploying only a part of their capital to acquire and
operate some of the assets with depressed prices.
We analyze the e¤ect of the business cycle on agentschoice to become insiders or ar-
bitrageurs. During boom periods, risky projects are likely to perform well and there are
fewer re sale opportunities anticipated by arbitrageurs. Hence, during the upturn of the
business cycle, a higher fraction of agents choose to become insiders and there is less liquid
capital put aside for arbitrage. As a result, when adverse shocks hit insiders during boom
periods, re-sale e¤ects in asset prices are more severe. This result explains why crises that
erupt after a long boom are associated with sharper, more severe downturns.2 Also, as the
di¤erence between the expertise levels of insiders and arbitrageurs widens (i.e. as insiders
assets become more specic) the return arbitrageurs make from these assets decreases. In
turn, arbitrageurs nd it protable to enter the market only when prices fall deeply. This
reinforces re-sale discounts further.
We put to use our equilibrium characterization of capital allocation in several extensions.
We draw out the welfare implications of arbitrage, and show that (perhaps surprisingly)
arbitrage capital can be detrimental for welfare. Although arbitrage capital cushions nancial
2Conversely, as economic times worsen, more capital is set aside for arbitrage. For instance, according to
the article titled Cashing in on the crashin the Economist on August 23, 2007, vulture funds raised $15.1
billion in the rst seven months of 2007, more than the $13.9 in all of 2006, to take advantage of re sales due
to expected distress in nancial markets. The same article points out that while some hedge funds su¤ered,
the others, such as Citadel, Ellington, and Marathon Asset Management had the ready cash. The article
highlights the strategy of Citadel to keep more than a third of its assets in cash or liquid securities, allowing
it to take advantage of re sales when opportunities arise.
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distress in crisis states, it can lead to ine¢ cient levels of ex-ante investment in protable
activities. The picture that emerges from our analysis is that private incentives lead to the
over-provision of arbitrage capital relative to the rst best. This over-provision is in fact a
manifestation of the illiquidity of protable activities due to the underlying moral hazard
problem that prevents pledging of all rents from expertise to external nanciers.
We also relax two important assumptions of our benchmark model. The rst is that
protable investments are completely illiquid so that arbitrage capital set aside is not used to
nance surviving insiders when re sales are undertaken by distressed insiders. The second
is that insiders gain expertise relative to arbitrageurs due to learning-by-doing e¤ects.
We show that our result holds when protable activities have external nancing capacity.
We examine the ex post equilibrium between employing arbitrage capital for asset acquisition
and providing nance to surviving insiders. Since arbitrageurs can make prots by acquiring
assets, they must earn the same rate of return on nance provided to insiders. Hence,
arbitrage capital gets allocated such that these returns are equalized. The result is that
re-sale discount in prices for acquisition of assets must equal that for provision of external
nance, giving rise to a spillover or contagion from illiquidity in the market for real assets to
that for nancing of these assets.
In general, such contagion arises also across real and nancial sectors whenever the pro-
vision of arbitrage capital in these markets is from a common pool; returns on di¤erent
investments in the portfolio of an arbitrageur must be the same. The fact that the quantity
of arbitrage capital is limited implies that these returns are positive in all markets where
arbitrageurs allocate capital.3
In sum, we present a novel channel of contagion in which even though the fundamentals of
two sectors are independent, the existence of re sales in one sector can give rise to re sales in
the other. An alternative way of stating our result is that there is excess co-movement across
sectors during crises and such co-movement is induced by limited liquidity in the market
relative to the quantity of assets being put up for sale.
Finally, we relax the assumption that arbitrageurs are the ones with limited expertise. To
this end, we assume that expertise is a natural endowment rather than a learning-by-doing
e¤ect, and consider two variants of our model. In the rst, insiders are experts relative to
arbitrageurs as in our benchmark model; in the second, agents with limited expertise become
insiders so that it is arbitrageurs who have relative expertise in running assets relative to
3For (apparent) dislocationsbetween di¤erent capital markets and the e¤ect of liquidations in one market
on prices in another, see an excellent discussion of the large body of extant empirical evidence in Du¢ e and
Struvolici (2008). For similar evidence in an international setting, see Rigobon (2002) and Kaminsky and
Schmukler (2007), and the discussion in Pavlova and Rigobon (2007). The literature by and large attributes
such dislocations to investment-style restrictions or limited arbitrage capital.
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insiders. We show that the equilibrium return earned by insiders and arbitrageurs is higher
in the economy where insiders are experts relative to arbitrageurs. Put another way, agents
with expertise endogenously arise as insiders and the rest sit on the fence waiting for arbitrage
opportunities. This lends support to our maintained assumption in rest of the paper.
2 Related literature
Fire sales are, of course, not new to our paper. The idea that asset prices may contain
liquidity discounts when potential buyers are nancially constrained and assets are not easily
redeployable were discussed by Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992). This
early literature suggests that rms, whose assets tend to be specic (that is, whose assets
cannot be readily redeployed by rms outside of the industry) are likely to experience lower
liquidation values because they may su¤er from re-sale discounts in cash auctions for asset
sales, especially when rms within an industry get simultaneously into nancial or economic
distress. Since then, re sales have often gured in models of crises (Allen and Gale, 1994,
1998, among others). Intimately tied to the notion of re sales is the idea that arbitrageurs
wanting to buy assets at steep discounts may also face nancing frictions due to principal-
agent problems. The resulting limits of arbitrage(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) can entrench
re-sale prices for a period of time once they materialize.4
Our contribution relative to this earlier literature is to focus on the ex ante decisions of
investors, which much of the literature takes as given, and thereby to explain the origins of
the limited nature of arbitrage capital as an equilibrium phenomenon. In this sense, our work
is closest to the analysis by Allen and Gale (2004) of the portfolio choice of banks between
holding safe versus risky assets. Gorton and Huang (2004), another closely related paper,
also considers the equilibrium portfolio choice of rms, deriving that it is socially ine¢ cient
to hold large quantities of safe assets required to avoid re sales, and studying in this context
the role of government bailouts during crises.
Our framework is tractable and facilitates crisp conclusions on key comparative statics
and welfare questions. In particular, our result that arbitrage capital is endogenously lower in
good times, and therefore, that crises arising in good times feature deeper re-sale discounts,
is a noteworthy result, which (to our knowledge) has not been discussed so far in the literature.
The depth of the current global nancial crisis and the long period of tranquility that preceded
it provides timely motivation for our result. Another advantage of our tractable framework
is to open up for scrutiny the arbitrageursaccess to di¤erent real and nancial markets, and
thereby identify a channel of contagion that relies purely on the limited nature of arbitrage
4Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino (2007) provide compelling episodic evidence for the fact that capital
appears to be slow movingwhen it enters markets a¤ected by re-sale discounts in prices.
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capital.
Rampini and Viswanathan (2007) provide a dynamic contracting set-up where several fea-
tures of nancing by rms are endogenously derived. Their focus is on exploring which rms
make investments and which preserve debt capacities for the future. This question is related
to our nal robustness check and their conclusion is similar; more productive rms undertake
investments today rather than saving for opportunities in future. While we model re sales
as an outcome from market clearing when buyers are nancially constrained, Rampini and
Viswanathan model asset prices as being temporarily low due to low cash ow realizations.5
To our knowledge, our paper is the rst to provide a model of contagion that owes to
limited arbitrage capital. Our results on this front are closest to Gromb and Vayanos (2007)
and Du¢ e and Struvolici (2008). Gromb and Vayanos (2007) consider arbitrageurs exploiting
re-sale opportunities across markets and this equilibrates returns they can earn in di¤erent
markets. However, the quantity of equilibrium arbitrage capital is exogenous in their setting.
Here, our central theoretical concern is to endogenize the quantity of arbitrage capital and
illustrate that its limited quantity as well as its limited expertise make re sales a robust
equilibrium phenomenon.
In a dynamic setting Du¢ e and Struvolici (2008) model the slow-moving nature of
arbitrage capital where arbitrageurs incur deadweight costs in obtaining external nance.
Arbitrage capital moves in a fashion that attempts to equilibrate returns across markets, but
is constrained in so doing by the nancing friction. In contrast, we do not model intermedi-
aries but instead show that the total amount of capital set aside in the economy for arbitrage
activities would be limited in equilibrium. While Du¢ e and Struvolici (2008) take the -
nancing friction of arbitrageurs as given, we model the friction faced by surviving industry
insiders as the inherent illiquidity of their expertise, and the friction faced by outsiders as
their lack of expertise relative to insiders, both justied by learning-by-doing e¤ects.6
Bolton et al. (2008) build a model where the primary friction is asymmetric information
about asset values. For liquidity needs, nancial intermediaries can rely on the liquid assets
in their portfolio (inside liquidity) or can sell assets (outside liquidity). The intermediary
can delay the sale of its assets hoping that the crisis is temporary. However, the longer the
intermediary waits, the more severe is the lemons problem and the greater is the risk to
sell assets at re-sale prices. The authors show that an immediate-trading equilibrium where
intermediaries rely on inside liquidity and where prices are close to fundamental values always
5In the strict sense of the word re sales, as is employed in the literature following Shleifer and Vishny
(1992), depressed prices due to uctuations in fundamentals are not re sales or arbitrage opportunities.
6Note that contagion has been derived in many other settings through portfolio ows (Kodres and Pritsker,
2002) or utility-based assumptions (Kyle and Xiong, 2001). Our model of spillover between real and nancial
markets is driven by limited arbitrage capital, which, in turn, is a manifestation of agency problems that
limit the external nancing capacity of rms.
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exists. However, for some parameter values, an e¢ cient delayed trading equilibrium results,
wherein intermediaries rely on outside liquidity resulting in re-sale prices. While asymmetric
information and complexity of assets is the main friction in their paper, this is not necessary
in our paper: Since there is only limited provision of arbitrage capital, even non-complex
assets can su¤er from re-sale discounts if shocks to insiders are su¢ ciently severe.
3 Model
The timeline for our model is given in Figure 1. There are two dates, indexed by t 2 f0; 1g:
There is measure of 1 of risk-neutral agents who maximize their sum of prots over the two
dates. Agents receive a unit endowment at date 0 and nothing else at other dates.
Each agent has access to a storage technology and a risky investment technology. The
storage technology transfers each unit invested at date 0 to one unit at date 1. One unit of
investment is needed for the risky technology. The return to agent is risky investment at
date 1 is denoted by eRi, where
eRi =  R with prob 
0 with prob 1  
The returns
neRio are independent across agents, so that by law of large numbers, precisely
a proportion  of agents that invested in the risky technology have the high return. However,
there is aggregate uncertainty in that  is itself random. Hence, there is uncertainty over
the proportion of agents that succeed in their risky investment.
At t = 0, agents decide whether to invest in the risky technology (and become insiders)
or invest in the storage technology to become arbitrageurs. We denote the proportion of
agents that become arbitrageurs by w. If the return is low, then the insiders entire capital
is wiped out and the project is put up for sale.7 The failed insidersassets are sold through
a competitive auction at market-clearing prices. The arbitrageurs and the insiders with the
high return, using their rst-period return, purchase failed insidersassets.
Crucially, we assume that arbitrageurs cannot generate the full return from insidersassets
due to their limited expertise in operating the insidersassets. We denote the net present
value of failed insidersassets by p when they are in the hands of insiders and p = (p ) ;
7Here, we do not model the bankruptcy of insiders. One can assume some xed costs for staying in business
such as rent for o¢ ce space, labor costs, etc. An insider who cannot cover these costs is put up for sale.
Alternatively, we can assume that when the return an insider can generate falls below a threshold value, she
prefers to liquidate her business and pursue alternative forms of employment. Let u be the reservation utility
of an insider to stay in business. For u(p) < u, where u represents the utility function of an insider, a failed
insider prefers to liquidate its business.
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with  > 0; when they are in the hands of the arbitrageurs. We assume that R > p.
The notion that arbitrageurs may not be able to use insidersassets as e¢ ciently as existing
insiders is akin to the notion of asset-specicity, rst introduced in the corporate-nance
literature by Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992).8
Depending on the rst period returns, some of the insiders (say a proportion of k) fail.
Since insiders are identical at t = 0, we denote the possible states at t = 1 with k, where
k = 1  .
4 Analysis
We solve the model backward, by rst considering the sale of failed insidersassets and the
resulting asset prices.
4.1 Sales and liquidation values
We keep track of two key features in the purchase of failed insidersassets. First, surviving
insiders and arbitrageurs compete with each other to acquire failed insidersassets. Second,
surviving insiders in fact may not have enough resources to acquire all failed insidersassets.
To focus on the interplay between these two features, we model the sale and liquidation stage
as follows.
(i) All failed insiders assets are pooled and competitively auctioned to the surviving
insiders and arbitrageurs as described below.
(ii) The surviving insiders and arbitrageurs submit a bid function yi(p) for failed investors
assets. The index i belongs in [0; (1 w)(1 k)] if i is a surviving insider, while i 2 [1 w; 1]
if i is an arbitrageur.
(iii) We assume that insiders cannot raise additional nancing.9 Hence, the resources
available to each surviving insider for purchasing failed insidersassets is the payo¤ R from
the risky investment.
(iv) The price p clears the market, where assets allocated to surviving insiders and arbi-
trageurs add up at most to the proportion of failed rms.Z (1 w)(1 k)
0
yi(p)di+
Z 1
1 w
yi(p)di  (1  w)k: (1)
(v) Concretely, we pin down the price p by focusing on the symmetric case where all
8There is strong empirical support for this idea in the corporate-nance literature. See footnote 1.
9We relax this assumption later on. See sections 5.1 and 5.3.
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surviving insiders submit the same schedule, that is, yi(p) = y(p) for all i 2 [0; (1 w)(1 k)],
and all arbitrageurs submit identical schedules, that is, yi(p) = ya(p) for all i 2 [1  w; 1]:
To solve for the allocation, we rst derive the demand schedule for surviving insiders. The
expected prot of a surviving insider from the asset purchase is y(p)[p   p]: The surviving
insider wishes to maximize this prot subject to the resource constraint:
y(p)  p  R: (2)
Hence, for p < p, surviving insiders are willing to purchase the maximum amount of assets
using their resources. Thus, the optimal demand schedule for surviving insiders is
y(p) =
R
p
: (3)
For p > p, the demand is y(p) = 0, and for p = p, y(p) is innitely elastic. In words, as
long as purchasing assets is protable, a surviving insider wishes to use up all its resources
to purchase assets.
We can derive the demand schedule for arbitrageurs in a similar way. Note that, arbi-
trageurs value these assets at p.
For p < p, arbitrageurs are willing to supply all their funds for the asset purchase. Thus,
their demand schedule is
ya(p) =
w
p
: (4)
For p > p, the demand is ya(p) = 0, and for p = p, ya(p) is innitely elastic.
Next, we analyze how failed insiders assets are allocated and the price function that
results.
We know that in the absence of nancial constraints, the e¢ cient outcome is to sell the
assets to surviving insiders. However, surviving insiders may not be able to pay the threshold
price of p for all assets. If price falls further, buying these assets becomes protable for
arbitrageurs and they participate in the auction.
The price cannot be greater than p since in this case we have y(p) = ya(p) = 0. If p 6 p;
and the proportion of failed insiders is su¢ ciently small, surviving insiders have enough funds
to pay the full price p for all assets. More specically, for k  k; where
k =
R
R + p
; (5)
the auction price is p = p. At this price, surviving insiders are indi¤erent between any
quantity of assets purchased. Hence, each surviving insider is allocated a share y(p) =
k= (1  k).
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For moderate values of k, surviving insiders cannot pay the full price for all assets but can
still pay at least the threshold value of p; below which arbitrageurs have a positive demand.
Formally, for k 2 (k; k], where
k =
R
R + p
; (6)
the price is set at p = (1  k)R=k, and again, all assets are acquired by surviving insiders.
Note that, in this region, surviving insiders use all available funds and the price falls as the
proportion of failures increases. This e¤ect comes from cash-in-the-market pricing, as in
Allen and Gale (1994, 1998), and is akin to the industry equilibrium hypothesis of Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) who argue that when industry peers of a rm in distress are nancially
constrained, the peers may not be able to pay a price for assets of the distressed rm that
equals the value of these assets to them.
For k > k; surviving insiders cannot pay the threshold price of p for all assets and protable
options emerge for arbitrageurs. Hence, for k > k, arbitrageurs have a positive demand and
are willing to supply their funds for the asset purchase. With the injection of arbitrageurs
funds, prices can be sustained at p until some critical proportion of failures k > k: However,
for k > k, even the injection of arbitrageur capital is not enough to sustain the price at p:
Formally, for k 2 (k; k]; where
k = min
(
1;
(1  w)R + w
(1  w)  R + p
)
; (7)
the price is set at p: At this price, arbitrageurs are indi¤erent between any quantity of
assets purchased. Hence, each surviving insider receives a share of y(p) = R
p
; and the rest,
ya(p) = (1  w)

k   (1 k)R
p

, is allocated to the arbitrageurs.
For k > k; the price is again strictly decreasing in k and is given by
p(k) =
(1  k)R
k
+
w
(1  w)k ; (8)
and y(p) = R
p ; and ya(p
) = w
p .
The following Lemma gives the resulting price function, which is also illustrated in Figure
2.
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Lemma 1 The price function is given as follows:
p(k) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p for k 6 k
(1 k)R
k
for k 2 (k; k]
p for k 2 (k; k]
(1 k)R
k
+ w
(1 w)k for k > k
: (9)
Note that the proportion w of agents that choose to become arbitrageurs a¤ects the price
p only in the fourth region where k > k, as well as the boundary k of the fourth region itself.
In particular, for higher values of w, p is higher in this region. Furthermore, the region itself
shifts to the left since
dk
dw
=
1
(1  w)2  R + p > 0: (10)
Hence, as w increases, the price p (weakly) increases, that is, we have dp

dw
> 0:
Note that the resulting price function is downward-sloping in the proportion of failed rms
k in two separate regions. In the rst downward-sloping region, arbitrageurs have not yet
entered the market (k 2 (k; k]) and there is cash-in-the-market pricing given the limited funds
of surviving insiders. In the second downward-sloping region, even the funds of arbitrageurs
are not enough to sustain the price at p, their highest valuation of assets.
4.2 Ex ante choice
Insidersexpected prot, denoted by E(i); consists of prot from their own investments,
prot from asset purchases and the amount they recover for their assets when they fail,
which can be derived using the price in equation 9. In particular, we have
E(i) = E

R + 
R
p
(p  p) + (1  )p  1

; (11)
where E denotes expectation over : Note that the only source of prot for arbitrageurs is
the asset purchase at re-sale prices. In particular, we have
E(a) = E

1
p
(p  p)+

; (12)
where E(a) denotes the expected prot for arbitrageurs. In equilibrium, the two payo¤s are
equalized at the ex ante stage, so that
E(i) = E(a); (13)
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as otherwise, there is an incentive for some agents to become arbitrageurs instead or vice-
versa.
The following proposition formally characterizes agentschoices.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, a proportion w 2

0;
p
1+p

of agents choose to become arbi-
trageurs, where w satises the indi¤erence equation in (13).
Hence, in any equilibrium, the fractions of agents who choose to become insiders and
arbitrageurs are bounded away from 0. Furthermore, cash-in-the-market prices are robust to
the endogenous choice of arbitrage capital. That is, there will always be states of nature where
price falls not only below the fundamental value of p but also below p, the value arbitrageurs
attach to these assets. This is a robust feature of our model. In order for arbitrage capital
to be undominated, there must be states of the world where arbitrageurs make prots. In
these states prices are below the arbitrageursvaluation of assets.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium w < p
1+p
, so that k < 1, and there are states of the world where
p < p.
We can also derive the following proposition that sets out the relation between the level
of arbitrage capital and the business cycle proxied by the aggregate distribution of successful
investments, and asset specicity.
Proposition 2 Equilibrium level of arbitrage capital w satises two features.
(i) Suppose f and g are two probability densities for , where g dominates f in the sense
of rst-order stochastic dominance. Let wf and w

g be the equilibrium level of arbitrage
capital under densities f and g, respectively. Then, wf > w

g.
(ii) Let bw = Rp
Rp+Rp+p2
: For w < bw; as the di¤erence of expertise between insiders and
arbitrageurs widens the equilibrium proportion of arbitrageurs decreases. That is, dw

d
<
0.
Consider (ii) rst. As the di¤erence between the expertise levels of insiders and arbi-
trageurs widens (i.e., as insidersassets become more specic), the return arbitrageurs make
from these assets decreases. In turn, the region over which arbitrageurs enter the market
shrinks. Thus, asset specicity reinforces re-sale discounts in prices further.
Next, consider (i). During boom periods, it is more likely that risky projects perform
well. The increased probability of the high return from the risky investment has two e¤ects
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on agentschoice that go in the same direction. First, the expected return from being an
insider increases. Also, the proportion of failed insiders decreases, which limits the re-
sale opportunities for arbitrageurs. Hence, during boom periods, we would expect a higher
fraction of agents to become insiders and take risky projects and a smaller fraction to set
aside capital for arbitrage.
Furthermore, from the price function in equation 9, we know that as the fraction of
arbitrageurs w decreases, we observe bigger deviations in the price of failed insidersassets
from the fundamental value of p. Hence, a corollary of Proposition 2 is that when adverse
shocks arise during boom periods, re-sale e¤ects in asset prices are more severe, resulting
in lower asset prices and higher price volatility. This result is a novel contribution of our
analysis and provides one explanation for why crises that follow long booms are associated
with greater asset price deterioration.10
Corollary 2 Adverse shocks during boom periods measured by high values of k result in
bigger deviations in the price of failed insidersassets from the fundamental value of p, that
is, (p  p(k)) increases.
4.2.1 Comparative statics
We report some numerical results illustrating comparative statics. In particular, we investi-
gate the e¤ect of parameters (; max; R; p) on w and E() (see Figures 6 and 7, respec-
tively). In our numerical examples, we use the parameter values  = 0:035; max = 0:7; R =
2:2; p = 2, and assume that  is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; max] ; unless we
state otherwise.
Figure 6a illustrates the ndings in Proposition 4.2, part (ii). Furthermore, as increases,
the expected prot E() increases, as shown in Figure 7a.
Figure 6b illustrates the relation between w and the business cycle analyzed in Proposi-
tion 4.2, part (i). As max increases, the proportion of insiders that fail decreases (on average)
and this makes re sales less likely and less protable. Furthermore, as max increases, the
expected prot from the rst period investment increases. These two e¤ects make it less
attractive to become an arbitrageur. Hence, w decreases as max increases. Also, these two
e¤ects increase expected prots, that is, E() increases as max increases, as shown in Figure
7b.
As R increases, the expected prots from the risky investment increases. Furthermore, the
liquidity within a surviving insider to acquire failed insidersassets increases. This increases
10Acharya and Viswanathan (2007) build an alternative explanation in a model where there is greater
entry of poorly-capitalized institutions when fundamentals are stronger, but in their model insiders serve as
arbitrageurs and there is no arbitrage capital set aside in equilibrium.
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expected prots E() of insiders (Figure 7c) and makes it more attractive to become an
insider. Thus, w decreases as R increases (Figure 6c).
Finally, as p increases, the scrap value of the investment in the hands of insiders (also
in the hands of outsiders for constant ) increases. This increases expected prots E();
as in Figure 7d. Furthermore, as the scrap value of the project increases (relative to the
expected prot from the rst investment as well), it becomes more attractive to become
an arbitrageur, relative to becoming an insider. Hence, as p increases, the proportion of
arbitrageurs w increases as in Figure 6d.
4.3 Is provision of arbitrage capital e¢ cient?
We now identify the socially optimal level of arbitrage capital. The social planner maximizes
the expected total output generated by the economy. We can write the total output of the
economy as follows:
E() = E

w + (1  w) (R + p) + yIp+ yAp

; (14)
where yI and yA represent the units of failed insidersassets acquired by insiders and arbi-
trageurs, respectively, and yI + yA = (1   w)k. Note that for E [(R + p)] > 1; the risky
investment has a higher expected return than the investment in the safe asset. Furthermore,
since insiders are e¢ cient users of assets relative to the arbitrageurs, that is, p < p, the
expected total output increases as more (less) failed insidersassets are acquired by surviving
insiders (arbitrageurs). However, when w is high, arbitrageurs compete with surviving insid-
ers for failed insidersassets. Hence, the expected total output decreases as arbitrage capital
w increases. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For E [(R + p)] > 1; the socially optimal proportion of agents that become
arbitrageurs is 0. That is, w = 0.
To summarize, when protable investments dominate safe assets, arbitrage capital is an
ine¢ cient way of allocating resources in the economy. While richer settings with risk-averse
agents and contagious e¤ects of price meltdowns (e.g., due to marking-to-market constraints)
may create some e¢ cient role for arbitrage capital, the ex ante ine¢ ciency arising from
foregone protable investments would arise in such settings too. In this sense, our analysis
provides a counterpoint to the generally accepted wisdom that price stability arising from
entry of arbitrage capital is welfare-enhancing.
From Proposition 3, we know that in our set-up, the rst-best is to have no arbitrage
capital. One way a regulator can achieve that outcome is to diminish the returns to arbitrage
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capital by not allowing the asset price to fall below arbitrageurs valuation p. The regulator
can achieve this in a variety of ways. For example, the regulator can price discriminate and
set the price at p for arbitrageurs whereas it can charge a lower price for surviving insiders.
While this can be a too extreme form of intervention, alternatively, the regulator can provide
su¢ cient liquidity to the system ex post. This can, for example, be achieved by bailing out
some of the failed agents or by providing liquidity to surviving insiders so that the price never
falls below p and, in turn, agents do not hold any arbitrage capital. If liquidity injections
result in scal costs, in general the regulator can only achieve second-best, which results in
a better outcome than the competitive equilibrium. Hence, the competitive equilibrium we
have is in general constrained ine¢ cient. However, in this paper, we do not provide a detailed
analysis of (constrained) (in)e¢ ciency of the competitive outcome since our main focus is to
derive more positive results from the model by relaxing some of its assumptions.
5 Contagion
In this section, we extend the benchmark model to analyze a novel channel for contagion from
the real to the nancial markets, as well as across di¤erent real and nancial assets. This form
of contagion results from illiquidity when arbitrage capital for di¤erent assets and markets
comes from a common pool. Put di¤erently, we characterize a form of excess co-movement
of prices across di¤erent sectors resulting from scarcity of arbitrage capital and illiquidity.
For the remainder of the paper, we normalize the measure of insiders to 1.11 We continue
to denote the arbitrageur funds by w, where w is at a level such that the price for assets has
the four regions as in Proposition 1.
5.1 Contagion from real to nancial markets
In this extension we relax assumption (iii) of our benchmark model (Section 4.1) that restricts
insiders ability to raise external nancing at date 1. In particular, we allow insiders to
generate funds from arbitrageurs against the assets they acquire and analyze contagion from
re sales in the market for real assets to the market for nancing of those assets. Even
though arbitrageurs are ine¢ cient in running insider assets, when the price is su¢ ciently low,
arbitrageurs make prots from acquiring and running these assets. Hence, arbitrageurs ask
for similar discounts to nance insiders. The result is a spillover or contagion from real assets
to nancial assets used for funding real assets.
Formally, we allow insiders to generate funds at t = 1 against the assets they acquire. In
11This simplies our expressions signicantly and does not change any of our results qualitatively.
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particular, surviving insiders issue shares to generate funds of q(k) per unit of share issued.
Hence, if a surviving insider issues s units of shares, the funds it has for acquiring failed
insidersassets at t = 1 is equal to [R + sq(k)] :
Note that this total liquidity available with the surviving insiders for asset purchases is
higher compared to the benchmark case. As a result, the region over which we observe cash-
in-the-market pricing is smaller, i.e., starts at a larger proportion of failures, compared to the
benchmark case.
With this extension of the model, we have two markets: one for assets of failed insiders
and one for shares of surviving insiders. To nd the equilibrium prices and allocations in
these two markets, we formally state the optimization problem that surviving insiders and
arbitrageurs face.
If a surviving insider issues s units of shares at the price q(k) and purchases m units of
assets at the price p(k); it makes an expected prot of m (p  p(k))  s (p  q(k)) :
Note that in any equilibrium, q(k) cannot exceed p. Thus, we have q(k) 6 p; and surviving
insiders issue equity just enough for the asset purchase, not more. Using this, we can state a
surviving insiders maximization problem as:
max
m;s
m (p  p(k))  s (p  q(k)) (15)
s.t. s  q(k) +R > m  p(k) (16)
s 6 m: (17)
For q(k) 6 p(k); surviving insiders cannot make positive prots by issuing equity to
purchase assets. Thus, when q(k) 6 p(k); s = 0 and m = R
p(k)
: And when q(k) > p(k);
surviving insiders make positive prots from asset purchase using the funds they generate by
issuing equity. Hence, they would like to issue as much equity as possible, that is, s = m:
We can state each arbitrageurs maximization problem in a similar way:
max
x;y
x
 
p  p(k)+ z (p  q(k))
s.t. x  p(k) + z  q(k) 6 1 (18)
where x and z represent the proportion of assets and the proportion of shares in surviving
insiders purchased by arbitrageurs, respectively.
When the share price of surviving insiders, q(k); is relatively low compared to the price
of failed insidersassets, p(k), arbitrageurs prefer to purchase shares of surviving insiders.
However, if p(k) becomes low compared to q(k); then arbitrageurs may prefer to acquire the
assets directly.
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When p(k) > p; arbitrageurs do not want to purchase assets and x(q; p) = 0: When
p(k) < p; arbitrageurs choose x to maximize:
x
 
p  p(k)+ w   xp(k)
q(k)

(p  q(k)) (19)
= x

p  p(k)p
q(k)

+ w

p
q(k)
  1

: (20)
Thus, if p(k) < p and p q(k) > p p(k); then arbitrageurs use all their funds for the asset
purchase, that is x = w
p(k)
: When p(k) < p and p q(k) < p p(k); arbitrageurs use all their
funds for the equity purchase, that is y = w
q(k)
; and when p q(k) = p p(k); arbitrageurs are
indi¤erent between the equity and the asset purchase.
In equilibrium, demand for shares of surviving insiders and assets of failed insiders should
equal their supply. Hence, we have the market clearing conditions:
(1  k)s = z (equity market) (21)
(1  k)m+ x = k (asset market) (22)
We concentrate on the equilibrium where the participation of arbitrageurs in the equity
market is maximum, which results in the maximum price for assets. However, even in this
setup, we show that for a large proportion of failures, the share price of surviving insiders
falls below their fundamental value p.
The equilibrium price functions for failed insidersassets and for shares of surviving in-
siders are formally stated in the following proposition and illustrated in Figure 3.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the prices for real assets and nancial shares are respectively:
p(k) =
(
p for k 6 bk
(1 k)R+w
k
for bk < k
and
q(k) =
8<: p for k 6 kp(k) for k > k ; (23)
where  = p
p
; bk = R+w
R+p
; and k = R+w
R+p
.
As Proposition 4 shows, the price of shares of surviving insiders follows an interesting
pattern. When the proportion of failures is large, cash-in-the-market pricing results in the
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price of assets falling below the threshold value of arbitrageurs, p. Since purchasing assets at
such prices becomes protable for arbitrageurs, in equilibrium they need to be compensated
for purchasing shares of surviving insiders. As a result, share price of surviving insiders falls
below their fundamental value, p. In other words, surviving insiders can raise equity nancing
only at discounts. Thus, limited funds within the whole system and the resulting cash-in-the-
market pricing a¤ects not only the price of real assets but also the price of shares of surviving
insiders. Furthermore, the discount that surviving insiders need to su¤er in issuing equity is
higher when the crisis is more severe (high k).
One important observation is that the introduction of capital markets do not a¤ect arbi-
trageursexpected prot. The reason for this is that even though arbitrageurs can acquire
shares of surviving insiders, in equilibrium, arbitrageurs make the same prot from asset and
share purchases. Hence, more generally, for the same level of arbitrageur capital w, E(a) is
the same as in the case with no capital markets.
However, insider prots, E(i), are not necessarily the same. With the introduction of
capital markets, on the one hand, prices are (weakly) higher but on the other hand, insiders
can acquire more assets as they have more funds. Even though the resulting overall e¤ect
on insiders expected prots is ambiguous, our results do not change qualitatively as in
equilibrium arbitrageurs need to make positive expected prots as in the earlier results from
Section 4. This requires that there be limited arbitrageur capital in equilibrium so that the
price falls below p in states with high proportion of failures k.
5.1.1 Limited pledgeability
So far, we assumed full pledgeability. However, due to various imperfections such as asym-
metric information, moral hazard, etc., surviving insiders may not be able to fully pledge
their future cash ows. Suppose there is moral hazard à la Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). If
an insider does not exert e¤ort, then she cannot generate p but only (p ) < p and enjoys a
non-pecuniary benet of B 2 (0;): Thus, for insiders to exert e¤ort, appropriate incentives
have to be provided by giving them a minimum share of the future prots. We denote this
share as . We can write the incentive-compatibility constraint as follows:
p > (p ) +B: (IC) (24)
Using the (IC) constraint, we can show that insiders need a minimum share of  = B

to
exert e¤ort.12 Therefore, insiders can generate at most a fraction  =
 
1   of its future
income from the asset purchases in the capital market if it is required to exert e¤ort.13 We
12See Hart and Moore (1994) for a model with similar incentive-compatibility constraints.
13Note that, once the rm is left with a share that is less than , it can as well pledge the entire future
return of
 
p . For  > pBp; this is less than (1   )p; the amount that can be pledged when the
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assume that at t = 0, the entire share of the prots belongs to the insider, and therefore,
moral hazard is not a concern.
Because of moral hazard at t = 1, insiders cannot generate the full value against the
value of the assets they acquire, but only q(k); where q(k) is the price of equity share in
surviving insiders, purchased by arbitrageurs. Hence, when a proportion k of insiders fail, the
maximum amount of funding available with the surviving insiders for the purchase of assets,
including funds that can be generated against returns from purchased assets, is given as:
L(k) = (1  k) [R + mq(k)] ; (25)
where m is the units of assets acquired by each surviving insider. Since, insiders cannot fully
pledge the return from the assets they acquire, it is possible that all the funds w with the
arbitrageurs cannot go to surviving insiders through the capital market. In particular, for
(1   k)mq(k) < w < (1   k)mq(k); only a fraction of arbitrageur capital goes to surviving
insiders through the capital market, whereas some of the arbitrageur capital goes directly to
the asset market, leading to a misallocation cost.
For this case, under limited pledgeability, the price functions for failed insidersassets and
for shares of surviving insiders are given as follows (illustrated in Figure 4):14
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, prices for real assets and nancial shares are respectively:
p(k) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
p for k 6 ek
(1 k)R+kp
k
for ek < k 6 eek
p for
eek < k 6 k
(1 k)R+w
k
for k < k
and
q(k) =
8<: p for k 6 kp(k) for k > k ; (26)
where ek = R
R+p(1 ) <
bk and eek = R
R+p p < k:
The results stated are for the case w > p: This is a more interesting case since, due to
moral hazard, all arbitrageur capital does not go to surviving insiders through the capital
surviving insider exerts e¤ort. Throughout, we assume that  >
p
Bp:
14We assume that  < p=p, which boils down to  < Bp :
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market. In particular, we have ek < bk so that the price starts to fall below the fundamental
value of p for a smaller proportion of failures. Furthermore, for eek < k 6 k; the arbitrageur
funds that cannot go to the capital market enter directly into the asset market. With the
injection of additional arbitrageur capital, the asset price can be sustained at p. However,
for k > k; all arbitrageur funds, directly or through surviving insiders, enter into the asset
market so that prices are the same as in the case with full pledgeability.
5.2 Contagion across countries
In this extension, we introduce another country (or industry, asset) into the benchmark model.
The objective is to analyze how illiquidity and the allocation of arbitrageur funds between
the two countriesassets can lead to contagion from one country to the other, resulting in
excessive co-movement across assets that have independent fundamentals.
Suppose that there are two ex-ante identical countries, denoted by i 2 f1; 2g; each with a
measure 1 of insiders. For the sake of simplicity of notation, we assume that these two coun-
tries have identical features to the economy introduced in the benchmark model except that
their shocks are independent. The insiders only access markets in their own country whereas
arbitrageurs can access markets in both countries. Since, in this section, our focus is the
spillover between the asset markets, we use the benchmark model where insiders cannot raise
any funding in the capital market. In Section 5.3, we relax this assumption and investigate
its implications for spillover from real to nancial markets across countries.
Insiders in country i are willing to pay a maximum price of pi = p; whereas arbitrageurs
are willing to pay a maximum price of p
i
= p; for failed rmsassets in country i = 1; 2:
Arbitrageurs can allocate their funds of w into these two countries, where wi represents
the funds allocated to country i = 1; 2, with w1 + w2 = w. Suppose that a fraction ki of
insiders in country i fails at t = 1.
For relatively small proportion of failures in the two countries, the asset prices in the two
countries are above the threshold price p arbitrageurs are willing to pay and arbitrageurs do
not enter the asset markets. Formally, forX
i=1;2
max

0;
 
kip  (1  ki)R
	
6 w, (27)
total liquidity of insiders is su¢ ciently high, so that, there are no protable options for
arbitrageurs. However, for ki > ki(kj), for i 6= j; where
ki(kj) =
R + w  max0;  kjp  (1  kj)R	
R + p
; (28)
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total liquidity of insiders is not su¢ cient to keep the asset prices above the threshold of
arbitrageurs and protable options for arbitrageurs emerge in these two countries. Note that
the threshold ki is decreasing in kj since dkidkj 6 0: Hence, country i enters the second cash-in-
the-market region relatively sooner when country j experiences a more severe crisis (higher
kj). In this case, in equilibrium, arbitrageurs allocate their funds in these two countries such
that they make the same prot from asset purchases in the two countries, which implies that
in equilibrium,
p  pi
pi
=
p  pj
pj
; that is, pi = pj: (29)
We obtain the following proposition that formalizes the contagion e¤ects on asset price in
country i from country j (also illustrated in Figure 5). The proposition also shows the level
of arbitrageur capital that is channelled to each country, and its determinants such as the
severity of crisis in these countries.
Proposition 6 Suppose that arbitrageurs can access two countries i = 1; 2, where they al-
locate wi of their funds in country i with w1 + w2 = w. Let ki be the proportion of insiders
that fail in country i at t = 1. The price of assets as a function of the proportion of failed
insiders in both countries (i and j, i 6= j) is as follows:
pi (ki; kj) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
p for ki 6 k
(1 ki)R
ki
for ki 2 (k; k]
p for ki 2 (k; ki(kj)]
(1 ki)R+wi
ki
for ki > ki(kj)
; (30)
where ki(kj) is given as in equation (28), and
wi =
ki (R + w)  kjR
ki + kj
: (31)
Furthermore, we have dw

i
dki
> 0 and dw

i
dkj
6 0:
The limited liquidity leads to cash-in-the-market prices for assets in domestic markets,
which creates protable options for arbitrageurs. To take advantage of these options, arbi-
trageurs channel their resources towards countries where assets are sold at re-sale prices.
However, when arbitrageur funds are limited, this would result in a ight of arbitrageur cap-
ital from other countries since, in equilibrium, arbitrageurs need to be making the same level
of prot in di¤erent countries. Hence, re-sale discounts in one country can have spillover
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or contagion e¤ect on other countries that are not hit by the same shock and in that sense
are fundamentally unrelated. This is due to limited liquidity of surviving insiders of a coun-
try, limited quantity of liquid arbitrage capital, and arbitrageursex-post portfolio allocation
decision.
5.3 Spillover across assets and across real and nancial sectors
We can also allow for arbitrageurs to provide nancial capital to surviving insiders, in addition
to the asset markets, in both countries. Hence, the analysis in this section generalizes the
analysis in sections 5.1 and 5.2. In equilibrium, arbitrageurs need to make the same prot
from acquiring shares or assets in the two countries, and this should hold even if capital
markets in one or both countries shut down completely.
For relatively small proportion of failures in the two countries, the asset prices in the two
countries are above the threshold price p arbitrageurs are willing to pay and arbitrageurs do
not enter the asset markets. Formally, when condition in inequality (27) is satised, there
are no protable options for arbitrageurs. However, for ki > ki(kj); where ki(kj) is given in
equation (28), total liquidity is low enough so that protable options for arbitrageurs emerge
in these two countries. In that case, in equilibrium, arbitrageurs allocate their funds in these
two countries such that they make the same prot from real assets and share purchases in
the two countries. This implies that in equilibrium:
(1) pi = pj:
(2) qi = pi, for i = 1; 2, where  =
p
p
:
Note that these conditions give us the result that illiquidity may lead to contagion across
real and nancial sectors, both within a country as well as across countries. In particular,
when a large proportion of insiders fail in country i, by equilibrium condition (1) above,
this may have an e¤ect on asset prices in country j. Furthermore, the re-sale discount in
the asset market of country i also a¤ects the nancial markets in both countries through
equilibrium condition (2) above.15
6 Robustness
In the analysis so far, insiders are more e¢ cient in running assets. This is because of the
expertise insiders gain through learning-by-doing, that is, expertise is acquired. In this sec-
15A complete derivation of the asset and share prices in both countries would be a repeat of the analysis
in sections 5.1 and 5.2. For the purpose of brevity, it is omitted from the current paper.
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tion, we allow for expertsand non-expertsin the model, where expertise or lack thereof
is an endowment to start with. In particular, experts can generate the high return R, while
non-experts can only generate

R  b from the risky investment when the return is high.
Furthermore, experts value failed insidersassets at p whereas non-experts are willing to pay
a maximum price of p = p   for these assets. To keep the expertise levels consistent and
comparable with the earlier set-up, we make the additional assumption that  = E()b:
We analyze which set of agents choose to become insiders as opposed to arbitrageurs. We
discuss two di¤erent cases. In the rst case (Model I), experts become insiders, whereas in
the second case (Model II) experts stay as arbitrageurs. The formal analysis of these two
cases can be found in Appendix II.
Model I is very similar to the case we analyzed so far.
In Model II, non-experts become insiders and experts stay as arbitrageurs. In this case,
arbitrageurs value failed insidersassets at p whereas surviving insiders are willing to pay
a maximum price of p for these assets. Also, note that the resources available with each
surviving insider for purchasing and running the failed insidersassets, denoted by bR, equalbR = R  b.
Hence, for small proportion of failures, failed insidersassets are purchased by arbitrageurs.
Surviving insiders start purchasing assets only when the price falls below p. Again, we have
the four-region price function as in equation (9). However, for low and moderate proportion
of failures, arbitrageurs purchase all failed insidersassets and insiders start purchasing assets
only when price falls to p, that is, when proportion of failures is high. And, for very high
proportion of failures, we have the fourth region where price falls below p.
Below, we provide some numerical results for a comparative statics analysis. In the nu-
merical examples, we use the same values as in the benchmark model, that is, b = :1; max =
:7; R = 2:2; p = 2, and assume that  is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; max] ;
unless we state otherwise.
Figures 8a and 9a illustrate, respectively, the di¤erent e¤ects of the di¤erence between
the expertise levels of insiders and arbitrageurs (; b) in Model I and Model II on w and
expected prots E(). As opposed to Model I, in Model II, as this di¤erence widens, the
price surviving insiders are willing to pay for failed insidersassets decreases. In turn, the
region over which surviving insiders enter the asset market shrinks. Due to these two e¤ects,
the expected prot of insiders decreases and the equilibrium proportion of agents that become
arbitrageurs (w2) increases.
Figures 8b and 9b are analogous to Figures 6b and 7b, respectively, that is, w is decreasing
in max whereas E() is increasing in max in Model II as well. The comparative statics on
R give qualitatively the same results on wand E() in Model II as in Model I in that as R
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increases, in both models, w decreases and E() increases (Figures 8c and 9c).
Finally, the comparative statics on p also give qualitatively the same results on wand
E() in Model II as in Model I. As p increases, wand E() increase. These results are
depicted in Figures 8d and 9d, which are analogous to Figures 6d and 7d, respectively.
The more interesting result is that the expected prot in Model I is higher than the
expected prot in Model II. This means that unless there are some frictions such as barriers
to entry, experts always choose to become insiders whereas non-experts become arbitrageurs.
Furthermore, the wedge between prots in the two models widens as b (and ) increases.
Hence, as insider assets become more specic (higher  and b), the incentive of experts to
become insiders is reinforced and only a larger friction (higher barriers of entry, for example)
can result in non-experts becoming insiders. This provides at least a numerical justication
for our benchmark assumption that arbitrageursexpertise in running assets is lower than
that of insiders.
7 Conclusion
Our theoretical framework sheds light on re sales as an equilibrium phenomenon when
investors can choose ex ante how much arbitrage capital to hold. The joint occurrence of
re sales and limited arbitrage capital that moves in slowlyto acquire assets (that is, only
when price discounts are su¢ ciently steep) is a robust feature arising from the fundamental
trade-o¤ faced by investors. Protable activities require investments in expertise, but these
very investments render them illiquid due to attendant agency problems. Arbitrage capital
can take advantage of depressed prices in crisis states, but entails costs in the form of foregone
protable investments and not investing in expertise. Equalizing the ex ante return from the
two activities leads to the interior nature of the equilibrium. Equilibrium arbitrage capital is
limited and re sales during crises become a robust phenomenon.
We demonstrated how our equilibrium construction can be used to good e¤ect in two ap-
plications. First, we showed that (perhaps surprisingly) setting aside of arbitrage capital can
be ine¢ cient from the standpoint of ex-ante investment. Although arbitrage capital cush-
ions nancial distress in crisis states, it leads to foregoing of ex-ante protable investments.
Our second application of the equilibrium construction was to examine a novel channel of
contagion between fundamental sectors that have independent fundamentals. The contagious
link arises from the fact that arbitrageurs must earn the same rate of return on capital from
di¤erent markets to which they supply liquidity.
It would be interesting in future research to examine a dynamic setting in which one can
study how arbitrage capital allocation shifts over time, in particular, as crises approach, and
24
calibrate the resulting prices and contagion across markets to empirically observed patterns.
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Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We prove the results that w 2 (0; 1) and k < 1 jointly by
analyzing all the ve possible regions for k that are given in equation (9).
From the indi¤erence equation (13), we have16
E



Rp
p

+ (1  ) p  1

= E

1
p
 
p  p+ ; (32)
which can be written as
E

1
p
 
p  p+   Rp
p

  (1  ) p+ 1

= 0: (33)
From equation (33), the equilibrium level of w is implicitly given as
E [h (;w)] = 0; where (34)
h (;w) =
1
p
 
p  p+   Rp
p

  (1  ) p+ 1: (35)
Recall that we have  = (1  k): Hence, h (;w) can also be written as
h (k; w) =
1
p
 
p  p+   (1  k)Rp
p

  kp+ 1: (36)
Next, we show that E [h (;w)] is (weakly) decreasing in w: Note that the price p(k)
given in equation (9) is continuous in w. Hence, h (k; w) is continuous in w. Thus, using
Leibnitzs rule, we can show that
@E (h)
@w
=
Z 1
k=0

@h
@w

f(k)dk: (37)
Note that w a¤ects h(k; w) only through the price p. From equation (9), for k 6 k;price
p is independent of w, so that @h
@w
= 0:
For k > k; we have
h (k; w) =
p  (1  k)Rp
p
  kp; (38)
16While the price depends on w and k, for simplicity of notation we use p instead of p(k;w).
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which gives us
@h
@w
=  

p  (1  k)Rp
p2
+ k

@p
@w

| {z }
>0
: (39)
Hence, for k > k;
 
@h
@w

has the opposite sign with the expression

p  (1  k)Rp+ kp2 :
Hence, in this region, for

p  (1  k)Rp+ kp2 > 0; 17 we have @h
@w
< 0; which means that
there is a unique w that satises the indi¤erence equation (13).
Next we show that w 2

0;
p
1+p

.
First, we show that w > p
1+p
cannot be an equilibrium. In that case, price never falls
below p and E (a) = 0; and E (i) = E

R + (1  )p  1 > 0: Hence, w > p
1+p
cannot
be an equilibrium as some arbitrageurs would deviate and become insiders.
For w = 0, we have
p(k) =
(
p for k 6 k
(1 k)R
k
for k > k
; and (40)
E (i) = E

Rp
p
+ (1  )p  1

= E [R + (1  )p  1] ; (41)
where i = R + (1   )p   1 for  2 [0; 1]: Note that did < 0 since R > p: Furthermore,
E (i) < R; and hence bounded.
For w = 0, we have
E (a) = E
h 
p=p
  1+i : (42)
Note that lim
!0
p = 0 so that lim
!0
 
p=p

= +1: Hence, if the probability distribution f() is
such that it does not converge to 0 too fast, then lim
!0
 
p=p

f() = +1 so that E (a) =
+1:18 Formally, for w = 0; we have p=p =  p=R   1

  1, which converges to +1 as 
17A su¢ cient condition for this inequality to hold is p < R R 1 : For k = 1, we have

p  (1  k)Rp+ kp2 =
p + p2 > 0: Note that

p  (1  k)Rp+ kp2 > p  (1  k)Rp ; which are both increasing in k, and the
inequality
h
p  (1  k)Rp
i
> 0 is a su¢ cient condition. Note that the minimum value k can take is RR+p ,
which is when w = 0. We have p   (1   k)Rp > p  

p
R+p

Rp: And, we can show that p  

p
R+p

Rp > 0,
for p < R R 1 :
18Note that for all continous f that converge to a positive value as  converges to 0, we have lim
!0 
p=p

f() = +1 so that E (a) = +1:
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converges to 0. Even though f() can converge to 0 as  converges to 0, as long as f() has
an order of  less than 1, we have lim
!0
 
p=p

f() = +1:19
Hence w = 0 cannot be an equilibrium as someone would deviate and take advantage of
the potential prots from re sales. Hence, in equilibrium, we have a unique in equilibrium
w 2 (0; 1). }
Proof of Proposition 2:
Part (i): Note that @h(;w)
@
< 0

that is, @h(k;w)
@k
> 0

is a su¢ cient condition forEf [h (;w)] >
Eg [h (;w)] when g FOSD f , where Ef and Eg represent expectations over probability dis-
tributions f and g, respectively. We already showed that @E[h(;w)]
@w
< 0; so that it is su¢ cient
to show @h(k;w)
@k
> 0 to prove the result. To do that, we look at the four possible regions for k.
(1) For k 6 k; we have p = p, which gives us h (k; w) =  (1   k)R   kp + 1: Hence,
@h
@k
= R  p > 0:
(2) For k 2 (k; k]; we have p = (1 k)R
k
; which gives us
h (k; w) =  (1  k)

Rp
p

  kp+ 1 =  kp  (1  k)R + 1: (43)
Hence, @h
@k
= R  p > 0:
(3) For k 2 (k; k]; we have p = p; and
h (k; w) =  (1  k)

Rp
p

  kp+ 1; which gives us @h
@k
=
Rp
p
  p > R  p > 0: (44)
(4) For k > k; we have p = (1 w)(1 k)R+w
(1 w)k ; and
h (k; w) =
(1  w)kp  (1  w)k(1  k)Rp  (1  w)(1  k)R  w
(1  w)(1  k)R + w  (1 k)R 
w
(1  w)+1:
(45)
Note that, in the above expression, the denominator of the rst term is decreasing in k,
whereas the second term is increasing in k. Hence, if the numerator of the rst expression
is increasing in k, then it is su¢ cient for @h(k;w)
@k
> 0: The derivative of the numerator of the
rst expression with respect to k is given as:
(1  w) p  (1  k)Rp+ kRp+R = (1  w) p Rp+ 2kRp+R : (46)
19For f that has an order of  greater than 1 and lim
!0
f() = 0; we have lim
!0
 
p=p

f() = 0; so that, for
w = 0, we have E (a) < +1: Under such probability distributions, it is possible to have no arbitrage capital
(w = 0) in equilibrium. For example f() = (a+ 1)a, for  2 [0; 1] and a > 1; would give such a result.
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Next, we show that, for R > p, we have

p Rp+ 2kRp+R > 0:
Let A = p Rp+ 2kRp+R: We have @A
@k
= 2Rp > 0: Hence, if A > 0 for k = k, we have
A > 0 for all k > k.
We have dk
dw
= 1
(1 w)2(R+p) > 0: Hence, if we can show that A > 0 for k = k and w = 0,
we are done. For w = 0, we have k = R
R+p
; which gives us A = p Rp+2

R
R+p

Rp+R: For
R > p, we have R
R+p
> 1
2
so that A > p+R > 0:
Hence, we have @h(k;w)
@k
> 0:
Part (ii): From the indi¤erence equation (13), we have E [h (;w)] = 0: Thus, we have
@E [h (;w)]
@w
 dw

d
+
@E [h (;w)]
@
= 0: (47)
We already showed that

@E[h(;w)]
@w

< 0; so that
sign

dw
d

= sign

@E [h (;w)]
@

: (48)
Hence, we need to show that

@E[h(;w)]
@

< 0: Note that the price p(k) given in equation
(9) is continuous in . Hence, h (k; w) is continuous in . Thus, using Leibnitzs rule, we
can show that
@E (h)
@
=
Z 1
k=0

@h
@

f(k)dk: (49)
Next, we analyze each of the four regions of k given in equation (9). Note that for k 6 k;
price p(k; w) is independent of : This, in turn, implies that for k 6 k; h () is independent
of :
For k 2 (k; k]; we have p(k; w) = p; where @p
@
=  1 < 0: For k 2 [k; k]; we have
h (k; w) =  (1  k)

Rp
p

  kp+ 1; which gives us @h
@p
= (1  k)

Rp
p2

  k. (50)
Note that @h
@p
is decreasing in k. Hence, if @h
@p
> 0 for k = k, then @h
@p
> 0 for all k 2 [k; k):
Furthermore, we have @h
@p
= (1  k)

Rp
p2

  k = 0 when k = bk = Rp
Rp+p2
. Hence, if k < bk, then
@h
@p
> 0 for all k 2 [k; k]: We have k < bk if and only if
(1  w)R + w
(1  w)(R + p) <
Rp
Rp+ p2
;
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which holds if and only if w < bw = Rp
Rp+Rp+p2
:
This, combined with the fact that
@p
@
< 0; gives us @h
@
< 0; for k 2 (k; k]:
For k > k; the price p is independent of  as all the funds within the surviving insiders
and arbitrageurs are exhausted. Hence, for k > k; @h
@
= 0:
Combining these results, we get

@E(h)
@

< 0:
Proof of Proposition 3: We have
yI =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1  w)k for k 6 k
(1  w)k for k 2 (k; k]
(1 w)(1 k)R
p
for k 2 (k; k]
(1 w)2k(1 k)R
(1 w)(1 k)R+w for k > k
and yA =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 for k 6 k
0 for k 2 (k; k]
(1  w)
h
k   (1 k)R
p
i
for k 2 (k; k]
w(1 w)k
(1 w)(1 k)R+w for k > k
:
(51)
Note that for w = 0, E() assumes its maximum value of
E() = E [ (R + p) + (1  )p] : } (52)
Hence, the socially optimal level of arbitrage capital is zero, that is, w = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The steps of the proof are organized in a way that lays down the results for di¤erent
regions of the proportion (k) of failed insiders.
(1) For k 6 bk; liquidity within the surviving insiders and the liquidity they can raise by
issuing shares to arbitrageurs is su¢ cient to sustain the price for the failed insidersassets at
p.
Since p(k) = p > p, we have x = 0 and m = k
1 k . Each surviving insider issues enough
equity, at q(k) = p; to purchase k
1 k units of failed insidersassets at p
(k) = p: Thus, we
have
R + sp =

k
1  k

p; which gives us:
s =
k
1  k  
R
p
and z = k   (1  k)R
p
:
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(2) For bk < k 6 k; liquidity within the surviving insiders and the liquidity they can raise
through equity issuance from arbitrageurs is su¢ cient to sustain p(k) at least at p.
Since p(k) > p, we have x = 0 and m = k
1 k . Each surviving insider issues enough equity,
at q(k) = p; to purchase k
1 k units of failed insidersassets at p
(k) = (1 k)R+w
k
, that is,
R + sp =

k
1  k

p(k); which gives us
s =
k
1  k and z = k:
(3) For k > k; total liquidity within the surviving insiders and the liquidity they can raise
through equity issuance from arbitrageurs is no longer su¢ cient to sustain p(k) at p: Since
p(k) < p, arbitrageurs may prefer to participate in the market for failed insidersassets.
If p(k) < p and p q(k) > p p(k); then arbitrageurs use all their funds for the asset
purchase, that is x = w
p(k) :
If p(k) < p and p q(k) < p p(k); then arbitrageurs use all their funds for the equity
purchase, that is y = w
q(k)
; and if p q(k) = q p(k); arbitrageurs are indi¤erent between the
purchase of surviving insidersshares and the failed insidersassets.
Now, let  = p
p
: Whether arbitrageurs buy shares of the surviving insiders or the assets
of the failed insiders, their entire funds w eventually end up in the asset market. Hence, for
k > k; the price for failed insidersassets is given as:
p(k) =
(1  k)R + w
k
: (53)
If the price q(k) of a share is higher then p(k), then arbitrageurs are better o¤ buying
the assets of failed insiders, rather than buying shares of the surviving insiders, that is, y = 0
and x = w
p(k) . Hence, we cannot have an equilibrium where q(k) > p
(k) and y > 0.
Next, we show that surviving insiders need to su¤er some discount when they generate
funds in the capital market. Note that arbitrageurs are willing to purchase shares of surviving
insiders, that is, y > 0, only when q(k) 6 p(k) and surviving insiders are willing to issue
equity, that is, s > 0, only when q(k) > p(k): Suppose that the market-clearing mechanism
works in a way that allows the maximum possible funds to go to insiders through equity
issuance, that is q(k) = p(k): Note that this allows for the highest price q(k) for shares.
However, even in this case, surviving insiders need to su¤er some discount when they generate
funds in the capital market. Hence, in equilibrium, for k > k, we have q(k) = p(k) < p: }
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Proof of Proposition 6: In equilibrium, we have pi = pj; which gives us
(1  ki)R + wi
ki
=
(1  kj)R + (w   wi)
kj
: (54)
Using this condition, we can show that the equilibrium level of arbitrageursfunds that is
channelled to country i is given as
wi = max

0;

ki (R + w)  kjR
ki + kj

: (55)
We have
dwi
dki
=
(2R + w) kj
(ki + kj)
2 > 0 and
dwi
dkj
=  ki (2R + w)
(ki + kj)
2 < 0: } (56)
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Appendix II
In the analysis so far, insiders are more e¢ cient in running assets. This is because of the
expertise insiders gain through learning-by-doing. In this section, we allow for experts and
non-experts in the model and we analyze which set of agents choose to become insiders as
opposed to arbitrageurs. Below, we analyze two di¤erent models where in Model I experts
become insiders, whereas in Model II experts stay as arbitrageurs.
Model I: This case is very similar to the case we analyzed so far. We have the expected
returns for insiders and arbitrageurs as given in equations (11) and (12), respectively. Thus,
the equilibrium level of arbitrageur capital, denoted by w1 satises the condition:
E [R] = E

1
p
(p  p)+   

R
p
(p  p)

  (1  )p+ 1

| {z }
=F (w1)
; (57)
where p is given in equation (9).
Model II: In this case, non-experts become insiders and experts stay as arbitrageurs. First,
we derive the price function for failed insidersassets. Note that, as experts are arbitrageurs in
this case, the rst set of failed insidersassets will be purchased by arbitrageurs and surviving
insiders will start purchasing assets only when the price falls below p.
Let w2 be the fraction that are experts and stay as arbitrageurs. And the rest, a fraction
(1 w2); are non-experts that are insiders. Let k2 be the fraction of insiders that fail at t = 1.
Note that the resources available with each surviving insider for purchasing and running the
failed insidersassets, denoted by bR, equal bR = R  b.
For p < p, the optimal demand schedule for arbitrageurs is ya(p) = w2p2 : For p > p, the
demand is ya(p) = 0, and for p = p, ya(p) is indeterminate.
For p < p, surviving insidersdemand schedule is y(p) = bR
p2
: For p > p, the demand is
y(p) = 0, and for p = p, y(p) is indeterminate.
The price p cannot exceed p since in this case we have y(p) = ya(p) = 0. If p 6 p; and the
proportion of failed insiders is su¢ ciently small, arbitrageurs have enough funds to pay the
full price for all assets. More specically, for k  k2; where k2 = w2(1 w2)p ; the auction price is
set at p = p and a share ya(p2) =
k2
w2
is allocated to each arbitrageur.
For moderate values of k2, arbitrageurs cannot pay the full price for all assets but can still
pay at least the threshold value of p. Formally, for k 2 (k; k], where k2 = w2(1 w2)p ; the price
is set at p2 =
w2
(1 w2)k , and again, all assets are acquired by arbitrageur.
For k2 > k2; arbitrageurs cannot pay the threshold price of p for all assets and protable
options emerge for surviving insiders. Hence, for k2 > k2, surviving insiders have a positive
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demand. With the injection of surviving insiders funds, price can be sustained at p until
some critical proportion of failures k2 > k2: However, for k2 > k2, even the injection of insider
capital is not enough to sustain the price at p: Formally, for k 2 (k; k]; where
k2 = min
8<:1;
0@ w2 + (1  w2) bR
(1  w2)
h bR + pi
1A9=; ; (58)
the price is set at p; and a share of ya(p) = w2p is allocated to arbitrageurs while the rest,
y(p) = (1  w2)k2   w2p , is allocated to surviving insiders.
And, for k2 > k2; the price is again strictly decreasing in k2 and is given by
p2(k2) =
(1  k2) bR
k2
+
w2
(1  w2)k2 ; (59)
and y(p2) =
bR
p2
and ya(p2) =
w2
p2
.
The resulting price function is given as follows:
p2(k2) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p for k2 6 k2
w2
(1 w2)k2 for k2 2 (k2; k2]
p for k2 2 (k2; k2]
(1 k2) bR
k2
+ w2
(1 w2)k2 for k2 > k2
: (60)
Note the di¤erence from the benchmark model : The rst set of failed insidersassets will be
purchased by arbitrageurs and surviving insiders will start purchasing assets only when the
price falls below p.
Using the price function in equation (60), we can calculate the expected prot for insiders
and arbitrageurs, which gives us the equilibrium condition as follows:
E(i) = E
"

 bR + bR
p2
(p  p2)+
!
+ (1  )p2   1
#
= E

1
p2
(p  p2)

= E(a): (61)
Proposition 7 Let w2 be the equilibrium proportion of arbitrageurs in Model II that is given
by the rst order condition in equation (61). We have w2 > w

1.
Proof: Note that using the rst order conditions in equation (57) for Model I and equation
(61) in Model II, we have F (w1) = G(w

2); where
E(R) = E
"
1
p2
(p  p2)  
 
R  b
p2
!
(p  p2)+   (1  )p2 + 1 + b#| {z }
=G(w2)
: (62)
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Also, note that as arbitrageur wealth increases, the price for failed rmsassets increase.
This, in turn, leads to a decrease in both F and G. Thus, we have @F
@w1
< 0 and @G
@w2
< 0:
Next, we can show that for the same level of arbitrageur wealth w, we have G(w) > F (w)
for all w, since bR = R  b and (p  p) > (p  p)+. Furthermore, G(w) > F (w) for all w,
implies that equilibrium level of arbitrageur capital is higher in Model II, that is, w2 > w

1.
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t = 0 t = 1 States  
  
• Returns from the 
risky investments are 
realized. 
 
 
 
 
k ≤ k 
 
 
 
• Price is the full price, p .  
• All assets are purchased by surviving insiders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• A fraction w of agents 
chooses to become 
arbitrageurs, while a 
fraction (1 - w) chooses 
to become insiders.  
• A proportion k of 
insiders fail. 
 
 
k < k ≤ k  
 
• Price is decreasing in k but is still above the threshold 
value of arbitrageurs, p .  
• All assets are purchased by surviving insiders. 
 
• Price is the threshold value of arbitrageurs, p .  
• Arbitrageurs acquire some failed insiders’ assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Insiders invest in risky 
projects using their own 
capital. 
 
 
 
• Failed insiders are 
auctioned to 
surviving insiders 
and arbitrageurs. 
  
• Price is below the threshold value of arbitrageurs p , and 
is decreasing in k. 
• Arbitrageurs acquire some failed insiders’ assets. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the model. 
k k k< ≤
k k>  
 
Figure 2: Price function. 
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Figure 3: Prices in Proposition 4. 
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Figure 4: Prices with limited pledgeability. 
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Figure 5: Prices  in Proposition 5. * *( , )i jp p
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Figure 6a: Effect of ∆
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Figure 6c: Effect of R
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Figure 6: Comparative statics on arbitrage capital (w*) for Model I
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Figure 6d: Effect of p¯
∆ = 0.035
αmax = 0.7
p¯ = 2
∆ = 0.035
R = 2.2
p¯ = 2
∆ = 0.035
αmax = 0.7
R = 2.2
αmax = 0.7
R = 2.2
p¯ = 2
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
Δ
E
(
π* )
Figure 7a: Effect of ∆
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Figure 7c: Effect of R
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Figure 7b: Effect of αmax
Figure 7: Comparative statics on expected profits (E(π*)) for Model I
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Figure 7d: Effect of p¯
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Figure 8a: Effect of ∆ (Model I) and ∆ˆ (Model II)
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Figure 8c: Effect of R (Model I) and Rˆ (Model II)
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Figure 8b: Effect of αmax
Figure 8: Comparative statics on arbitrage capital (w*)
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Figure 8d: Effect of p¯
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Figure 9a: Effect of ∆ (Model I) and ∆ˆ (Model II)
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Figure 9c: Effect of R (Model I) and Rˆ (Model II)
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Figure 9b: Effect of αmax
Figure 9: Comparative statics on expected profits (E(π*))
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Figure 9d: Effect of p¯
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